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A B S T R A C T
This paper discusses how network theory and social capital can help explain diﬀerent patterns of inclusion of
small and medium sized producers in agri-food clusters. We make the argument that despite the centralized
nature of practices, the manner in which inclusion takes place can vary signiﬁcantly depending on structural
features of local networks and governance factors, especially social capital and the role of lead organisations.
Social network analysis allows us to investigate how diﬀerent patterns of bonding, bridging and centrality of key
actors in agricultural clusters can inﬂuence diﬀusion of knowledge. We frame this discussion through a typology
that allows us to identify diverse scenarios of inclusion of small producers. This is then used to guide an em-
pirical analysis of two agri-food clusters of small producers in Peru (mango) and Colombia (palm oil). Judicious
use of mixed methods and the typology can prove useful to explain diverse patterns of inclusion which have
important implications for small-scale agricultural producers.
1. Introduction
A signiﬁcant body of policy thinking views the growth and spread of
agribusiness and speciﬁcally agri-food activity in economically devel-
oping countries as a positive step for small-scale agricultural producers
(Kumar et al., 2010; UNDP, 2010; Vorley et al., 20081). The opportu-
nities to open new markets can act as a spur for investment in infra-
structure in rural areas and the provision of agricultural extension
services can enhance productivity and knowledge transfer capabilities
for small-scale farmers. However, other voices raise concerns and as-
sociate incorporation of small-scale producers in commodity export
activity with over-dependence of vulnerable farmers on unstable mar-
kets and over-reliance on large buyer ﬁrms (Cáceres, 2015; Markelova
et al., 20092). Hence, although growth of agri-food activities is con-
sidered an important policy tool to allow hitherto marginalised farming
communities to gain a foothold in expanding markets (Gomes, 2007;
McCormick, 1999), the dynamics of inclusion may be quite diﬀerent for
small-scale producers. The question that we address in this paper is how
diﬀerent local arrangements around construction of local networks and
network governance can lead to diverse forms of inclusion that have
contrasting outcomes for small-scale producers in terms of access to
knowledge and new practices.
By the term inclusion we refer to the insertion of small-scale pro-
ducers in local networks of knowledge transfer that exist to supply
agribusiness markets. We are therefore particularly interested in the
structure and governance of these networks at the cluster level where
small-scale producers are agglomerated. Structures of social networks
provide insights into the connectedness of actors and their social capital
and they can also show the diversity of knowledge available to actors
and the resources actors have at their disposal (Cagnin et al., 2012;
Carpenter et al., 2012). Governance of networks on the other hand can
explain how new technologies and practices are introduced and the
agency of speciﬁc actors (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). Our approach
therefore addresses a concern that existing studies of diﬀusion of
technology in agri-food contexts, that often focus on relationships
within chains of production, can often leave out local dynamics.
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We frame the analysis within a typology3 of inclusion that lays out
four scenarios in a two-by-two matrix, the axes of which are labelled as
network bridging (a proxy for openness of the cluster), network
bonding (the degree of internal connectedness of local actors) and a
parallel measure of small producer participation (or network govern-
ance). The discussion and typology act as a guide to an empirical
analysis of two agricultural clusters with contrasting experiences of
inclusion. These are a palm oil cluster in the municipality of Puerto
Wilches in central - north east Colombia and the mango cluster in the
Piura area of northern Peru. These geographical clusters share a
number of features including similar number of producers, dominant
agri-food export industry and the predominance of small-scale produ-
cers. Social network analysis is used initially to identify and compare
the structure of networks. Because network structure has little to say
about governance and the source of new ideas/programs we subse-
quently use qualitative material to assess diﬀerences in governance. We
end with illustrative cases of two possible permutations that indicate
how diﬀerent combinations of network structures combine with net-
work governance to aﬀect the development of inclusive agriculture.
These suggest that a highly hierarchical and centralized network cluster
will be strongly inﬂuenced by actor(s) at the centre of the network, and
therefore that inclusion dynamics can vary considerably according to
behaviour of these anchor actors. By contrast, greater decentralisation
of links and small producer self-organisation is associated to sub-net-
works that, within the conﬁnes of narrow protocols and certiﬁcations
imposed by buyer chains, are still able to follow diﬀerent strategies of
inclusion for adoption and use of technology.
2. Inclusion of small producers in agri-food: a social network
approach lens
There exists a dominant view amongst agricultural extension prac-
titioners that small producer inclusion in agri-food markets primarily
comes down to diﬀusion of information of practices. The focus lies on
codiﬁcation of top-down systems of knowledge transfer and the pro-
pagation of “packages” of new practices and protocols by agricultural
extension services to farmers (Morris, 1991). A signiﬁcant body of
academic literature addressing questions of small-scale producer
farming in agribusiness reinforces this view, especially in regard to less
developed economies. For example, from the natural resource man-
agement perspective it is recognized that state-funded extension ser-
vices will organise technology transfer in a top-down manner (Darr and
Pretzsch, 2008; Lahai et al., 1999). Driving these practices is a set of
regulations handed down by large buyer ﬁrms or national scientiﬁc
consortiums designed to meet standards of quality that reﬂect narrow
codiﬁed protocols. The global value chain literature similarly focusses
on the quality of predominantly top-down diﬀusion of knowledge. For
example Dolan and Humphrey (2000, 2004), whilst recognising the
eﬀorts of UK supermarkets to achieve a more hands-on relationship
with diﬀerent actors in value chains, suggest greater use of detailed
written protocols and procedures for growing, harvesting, processing
and transport. Humphrey (2006) and Jan van Roekel et al. (2002) also
argue that the initial simple distinctions between buyer-driven and
production-driven agribusiness supply chains described in Dolan and
Humphrey (2000) has given way to more nuanced relationships be-
tween actors in the chain. Nevertheless, within the above accounts local
institutions and small-scale producers appear to be fairly passive ob-
servers as new practices are introduced by large buyers further up the
value chain or by national scientiﬁc consortiums.
There is of course an extensive body of literature which has criti-
cized narrow top-down approaches to diﬀusion and technical change
(Mansuri and Rao, 2013) in agricultural developmental contexts
(Clarke and Ramirez, 2014). The critique is that in centralized systems,
new practices are introduced and justiﬁed on the basis of reductionist
discourses of “sound science” (Essex, 2008) that privilege one way
linear ﬂows of information from “technical experts” to individual
farmers (Rogers, 2010). However, little is said in this account regarding
the diﬃculties of incorporating small-scale producers where the
dominant norms for introducing new practices are centralized and top-
down.
A diﬃculty of the debates concerning inclusive approaches in agri-
food and agribusiness more generally is that much work is either
framed around assumptions that prioritize top-down diﬀusion of tech-
nology that leaves little room for agency of small-scale producers or on
micro studies that promote bottom-up participation and democratiza-
tion processes that can be diﬃcult to achieve in agri-food environments
where protocols for production, certiﬁcations and food safety standards
are inﬂexible. We are therefore left somewhat unclear about how local
contingencies can inﬂuence inclusion outcomes.
Yet, some studies show that inclusive paths to incorporation of
small-scale producers in Andean agri-business contexts can occur by
building local social capital. In particular, detailed case study work by
Bebbington (1997) and Bebbington (1998) show how local organisa-
tions have, in some circumstances, been able to regenerate rural small
farm production by managing, accessing and generating technologies
and providing technical assistance to local producers, as well as es-
tablishing strong external linkages including negotiating with the state,
accessing markets and linking with ﬁnancial services. These studies are
to some extent antecedents to this paper for they set out the importance
of social capital and brokers for local development. This paper takes
these studies further by developing qualitative and quantitative meth-
odology that allow a more in-depth understanding of the organisational
and cluster dynamics. Reﬂecting on the above critique, we adopt are-
lational approach that allows us to incorporate both structural and
contingent features of local clusters. The basis of our argument is that
important inter-cluster diﬀerences in inclusion can be analysed from
how local patterns of network structure and network governance
emerge. Network structure refers to the connections actors establish to
receive information and know-how and their position (central, con-
nected or marginal) within this network. The structure of a local buyer-
driven agribusiness network is likely to be dominated by large buyers
with separate links to suppliers of commodities. Small producers that
sell these commodities to local buyers may be scattered or may estab-
lish their own social ties and collaborations within a geographical
cluster. Therefore we take a broad view of network formation that re-
minds us that there can be a range of network structures within which
patterns of inclusion, social fragmentation and exclusion can exist
(Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). Network gov-
ernance on the other hand refers to the nature of the relationships
between actors including the degree of participation small producers
have in how practices are introduced. Below we lay out the main ar-
guments.
3. Debating network structure: bonding and bridging
Social networks (and its associated theory of social capital) has been
a recurrent topic of debate and discussion on collective action and
development. It became particularly fashionable after the World Bank
adopted social capital as a key policy tool in the 1990s to encourage a
social agenda to reduce social exclusion and build community capacity
(Bebbington et al., 2008). The fact that the delivery of everyday goods
and services by the state is non-existent or highly deﬁcient in less
economically developed countries means that network type structures
such as community groups often play an essential role in public pro-
vision (Fafchamps, 2006) which heightens the importance of con-
nectedness. At the centre of our discussion will be diﬀerent network
structures and the relationships (and potential tensions) between
3 We speciﬁcally refer to a typology rather taxonomy because the objective is to put
forward ideal scenarios that help develop new approaches to the study of inclusion in
agricultural clusters.
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bonding represented by highly connected actors and bridging that re-
presents open networks that encourage the search for new knowledge
and innovation. As discussed below, these two features of networks and
the relationships between them appear repeatedly in studies of devel-
opment.
Network structures can be analysed around two commonly used
lenses. At one end is a spectrum composed of dense networks, referred
to as “bonding”, where social practices are directed to increasing co-
hesion in communities and practices tend to be more homogenous
(Coleman, 2000). Hence participation in the production of common
products ostensibly facilitates complementary linkages (Visser, 1999).
Collective action that emerges from bonding activity has traditionally
played an important role in family agriculture, with authors such as
(Schmitz, 1995) arguing that “active collective eﬃciency'” can over-
come the drawbacks of small size and the problems facing small pro-
ducers emerge more from isolation than size. Coleman (2000) argues
that the advantage of bonding lies primarily in the ability to establish
and impose common rules and norms because network members have
the power to decide who joins and who is excluded and can sanction
opportunistic members. This creates a degree of predictability in the
behaviour of others and allows greater investment in partners. It is also
facilitated through a common bond, such as homogeneity of socio-
economic status.
An alternative view of social networks eschews the advantages of
bonding and by contrast extolls the virtues of bridging, which is where
information ﬂows between rather than within dense networks. Burt
(1992) refers to these as bridging networks that can be exploited by
organisations that act as brokers of information ﬂows amongst in-
dividual actors. In contrast to the bonding approach, bridging empha-
sizes to a greater extent the beneﬁts that actors have when freed from
tight relationships. This approach therefore emphasizes to a far greater
degree the importance of linking to knowledge networks that come
from outside the cluster. The key notion here is that highly dense net-
works can suﬀer from redundant information and in this scenario, the
coordination costs of maintaining a network can outweigh the ad-
vantages that might emerge from it. The focus therefore lies in in-
dividual actors acting as brokers with access to less redundant in-
formation through strategic position in a network. Bridging as a speciﬁc
division of labour addresses a critical feature of this discussion which is
how open, diverse and innovative agribusiness clusters can be and how
this diversity can beneﬁt the diﬀerent parts of the network. Research
highlighting the importance of brokering in smallholder agriculture
includes Goldberger's (2008) study of scientization of organic agri-
culture, where brokers were crucial in the legitimization of alternative
value chains. A boundary framework is used to understand how nego-
tiation among socially and geographically disparate social worlds has
resulted in diﬀusion of non-certiﬁed organic agriculture in Kenya.
Giuliani and Bell (2005) also emphasize the importance of brokers to
link with global buyers in Chilean the wine sector.
Debates and evidence on bonding and bridging reﬂect important
discussions on the complementarities and possible trade-oﬀs and ten-
sions between building collective action and strengthening social ca-
pital for small producers to exercise agency power on the one hand and
the potential drawbacks of tight membership rules that can lead to
exclusion and inwardness that resists new innovations on the other
(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Bebbington et al., 2008; Carter, 1996;
Thorp et al., 2005). For example, the argument is made that for open-
ness to occur internal diﬀerentiation between producers is required to
allow the necessary leadership to evolve and encourage greater open-
ness. Devaux et al. (2009) also makes the point that heterogeneity and
the involvement of diverse actors, including not only farmers but also
other actors in the value chain (including chefs) played a critical role in
collective action for innovation in a case study of the Papa Andina. A
balance between bonding and bridging of activities could in theory
encourage connectivity and heterogeneity of actors necessary to com-
bine inclusion and innovation (Narayan, 1999; Pelling and High, 2005).
Indeed, Burt (1992) has argued that bridging is interdependent to
bonding because communities can have a division of labour that moves
between the two. Clearly this is an area that needs empirical analysis to
understand more clearly how bonding and bridging are formed.
4. Network governance: hierarchies, central actors and bottom-up
action
In addition to bonding and bridging, we introduce a third lens to
consider how new innovation practices are introduced through the
governance of social networks. Isolated from the inﬂuence of other
contextual factors, information on network structures say little about
how inclusive practices are introduced or distinguishes between dif-
ferent modes of introducing new knowledge that can have fundamen-
tally diﬀerent implications for small producers. The discussion of social
networks therefore requires another dimension that picks up on the
hierarchy or level of centralization of small producer networks in terms
of the roll out, adoption and adaptation of new technologies and
practices. This question overlaps with a long and intense debate in the
agricultural development literature on preferences for top-down and
bottom-up governance for the introduction of new practices.
Preferences for top-down practices are inherent in Hardin's (1968)
“tragedy of commons” argument that pointed to the tendency towards
over-consumption of common resources and Olson's (1965) concerns
over free-riding of public goods. Top-down and more centralized im-
plementation of new practices is argued to work best if there are ben-
eﬁts from economies of scale, require high levels of central coordination
and where preferences and needs are likely to be more homogenous
(Mansuri and Rao, 2013).
Bottom-up initiatives by contrast provide for greater participation of
local actors. Highly inﬂuential contributions by Hirschman (1970) on
collective agency, Ostrom (2015) on common pool resources and
Sugden and Sen (1986) on broad-based capabilities emphasize the
importance of the poor and marginalised as informed participants to
justify decentralized bottom-up initiatives. Bottom-up inspired prac-
tices emphasize knowledge that draws from the practical experience of
producers and takes into account their interests, hence is more likely to
reﬂect on issues such as costs of purchase and maintenance of tech-
nology.
As argued above, agri-food is likely to be dominated by more cen-
tralized practices although there can be important local factors that can
inﬂuence how practices are introduced. Based on the above discussion
of bridging, bonding and network governance, in the following section
we present a typology that provides hypothetical scenarios of inclusion
(and exclusion) of small-scale producers in agri-food clusters. The ad-
vantage of diﬀerent scenarios is that they can help guide the design of
future empirical studies.
5. Building a typology of inclusion of small-scale producers in
agri-food
Our approach is built on the understanding that social networks
reﬂect the cohesive social relationships upon which collective actions
are built (Hoﬀ, 2001). Social networks have the advantage of providing
a rigorous language for describing the properties of relations and
measurable indicators for certain properties that underlie social capital
(for example membership of social groups, connectivity, hierarchical
relations) (Moody and Paxton, 2009). On the other hand, social capital
concepts explain how social networks come to exist and highlight how
context shapes relations. The value of this typology therefore is that it
moves the narrative on from a discussion of the inﬂuence of separate
discrete variables (bonding, bridging and participation) to a discussion
of the interplay of three variables and its impact in a common space.
This allows us to operationalise and contextualise the framework to the
cluster level and lays the ground for the subsequent empirical analysis.
We also underline the point that this is a typology of inclusion and is
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therefore built from the standpoint of all producers and service orga-
nisations and their links within the cluster. This is described visually in
a two-by-two matrix in Fig. 1 with three labelled axes that we call
bridging, bonding and participation, with values rising as one moves
along the axis. Low levels of bridging means the cluster will be rela-
tively closed to diverse sources of new knowledge because there are few
knowledge links outside the cluster. This means high levels of re-
dundancy of information within the cluster that could translate into
mono production and limited attempts to introduce new practices. Low
bridging could also leave the cluster prone to natural-resource crisis
such as pests and blights that aﬀect producers because little research is
undertaken to combat and keep up-to-date with changing phytosanitary
trends. By contrast, high bridging is associated with a range of links
from diﬀerent organisations from outside the cluster and therefore
provides greater diversity of knowledge. This may lead to more in-
novation and experimentation with new seeds, crops and adjustment to
local conditions, as well as strategies to reach new markets that require
diﬀerent protocols for production and logistics.
On the bottom axis we place bonding that, as discussed, refers to the
degree of connectedness between small producers. High bonding im-
plies that knowledge transfer will be eﬃcient as networks are highly
cohesive. Burt (1992) also refers to these highly dense networks as
“closure” and suggests that in highly cohesive groups, strong culture
and teams can enhance trust and allow reputation to be controlled so
that individuals can be trusted to collaborate.
To these two axes we superimpose a governance axis labelled par-
ticipation, which refers to the degree of collective activity in decisions
concerning introduction of new practices. Low levels of participation
imply weak small producer representation or independent levels of
coordination and a high degree of power and inﬂuence in a central
administrative body to establish protocols for everything from com-
batting agricultural diseases or reform of energy distribution systems
(Soumonni, 2010). In these cases new technologies or organisational
innovations are introduced in a more centralized fashion and power, in
the sense of the ability to frame how new practices are designed and
used, is more concentrated within certain organisations with high
agency power. Top-down practices may also reﬂect strategies by a large
company to oblige smaller producers to adopt speciﬁc practices for its
beneﬁt in the market, or indeed favour some groups over others. By
contrast, with high participation, extensive local discussions will tend
to take place regarding new technologies and practices and questions of
democracy, sustainability and frugal innovation tend to be prioritised.
Bonding and participation are not identical concepts. The latter is
explicitly deﬁned in terms of collective agency power, the former is a
feature of a physical network that can emerge for a variety of reasons
including a desire to establish solidaristic values that underpin com-
munity actions (Thompson, 2003) to enhance capability (Moser, 1998),
or as an antidote to vulnerability (Isham, 2002). Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to assume that some sort of coherence amongst networks
will underpin community action and as (Burt, 1992) suggests, in highly
dense networks (or high bonding) a strong collective culture emerges
that enhances trust and there is liable to be a closer relationship be-
tween actors. Therefore we associated high levels of bonding with
higher levels of small–producer participation in the typology. Where
bonding is low actors will not be able to act collectively. Formal con-
nections with a lead organisation may exist but is likely to be one-way
with high dependence upon one dominant organisation.
Diﬀerent degrees of bonding, bridging and participation can be
thought of as generating distinct scenarios as shown in Fig. 1. We label
a cluster that is open with high levels of bridging but low cohesion and
weak participation as fragmented. This will occur when some dominant
actors have important external and non-redundant ties that bring new
knowledge, but large numbers of small producers have few links and
limited access to diverse sources of knowledge and there is a low tra-
dition of community engagement. This may give way to new practices
being introduced with little discussion and can create a polarisation
between the larger producers that are well-connected to agribusiness
networks on the one hand and smaller producers reliant on single
connections with narrow bandwidth on the other. The network archi-
tecture may be visualised in terms of a “hub and spoke” structure with a
central organisation linking small producers in one-to-one type links.
Diﬀusion can therefore be rapid but learning may be through imitation
and with limited scope for local discussion. This is typically the case
when implementing norms set by outside bodies to open export mar-
kets, such as detailed by Carbajal and Hernandez (2008) in the Mexican
avocado sector where discussions tended to be limited to implementa-
tion of ﬁxed protocols and technologies deﬁned by outside actors. In
this segment there may also be clusters that are in the early stages
opening up to markets. For example Heller and Isaac’s (2003) account
of a participatory programme in Kerala stressed the eﬀorts to bring the
community together by encouraging certain more democratically aware
citizens to engage in civic activities that resulted in better local gov-
ernment. This was a precursor to the establishment of working com-
mittees and village meetings that increased participation.
A network showing high bonding, low levels of bridging and high
participation we label as a cohesive network. High network cohesion
knits actors together and practices can diﬀuse widely. Key service or-
ganisations will focus on bringing together fragmented actors and
creating infrastructures that can serve as a basis for common action.
However there are limited opportunities for exploration because of a
lack of bridgers and introduction of new ideas from outside is given a
lower priority. Thus it is likely that most of the eﬀorts of the lead or-
ganisations involve protecting connected producers from information
inconsistent with what they already know. Links tend to be established
between actors with similar backgrounds, which lowers risk, reduces
exposure and therefore assumes knowledge transfer within a set
boundary that could be a geographical area. In this scenario, lead or-
ganisations (whether large single producers or representatives of col-
lectives), will tend to use their authority to strengthen collective ac-
tions. High bonding therefore suggests (but doesn’t necessarily
represent proof of) a community where activities and learning are based
on strong common norms. But without brokers, practices may well be
inward looking and focus on existing experience. McDermott et al.
(2009) description of the San Juan wine cluster in Argentina showed
Fig. 1. Typology of social capital and inclusion of farmers.
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that despite the existence of high social capital, the lack of cross cutting
ties between diﬀerent social and producer communities limited broad-
based learning. Hence redundancy and lock-in is possible. Where both
brokerage is low and communities are largely fragmented there is a
dearth of opportunities and/or capabilities amongst local actors to at-
tain these.
We characterise a scenario of high openness to external ideas and
broad based inclusion as an open and inclusive cluster. This scenario is
where high bonding connects actors and bridging creates links to new
sources of knowledge. High rates of social participation means some
adaptation of new practices and technologies in response to small
producer requirements takes place. An example could be McDermott
et al's (2009) study of the Mendoza wine cluster, where bridging roles
are played by government support institutes such as public research
labs and training centres that are also committed to deliver collective
resources. Devaux et al's (2009) study of participatory market chain
model and stakeholder platforms in the Andean potato similarly
showed how small farmers were able to achieve high levels of organi-
sation with the beneﬁt of researchers and other service providers to
experiment in ﬁnding new markets from existing varieties. New re-
lationships are encouraged and built within the context of stability of
existing ties, but high levels of social participation ensures there is
extensive local discussion and eﬀorts are made to ensure the involve-
ment of small producers and their organisations. Social capital exists
alongside opportunities for learning and innovation. Because there is
high levels of participation, shared use of technology is often favoured
by small producers as a means of lowering costs.
Finally, we label a cluster where networks are typically fragmented
and there is little scope for brokerage opportunities as redundancy. This
could describe a mature agribusiness sector or isolated area where there
exist few opportunities for new markets and few lead organisations able
to support isolated communities in the development of capabilities.
Participation will be limited and practices often not suited to the needs
of smaller producers. The absence of collective initiatives means some
actors will typically remain marginalised and large inequalities can be
locked in.
6. Methodology
Fig. 1 poses a series of ideal-type scenarios of small producer in-
volvement in agri-food knowledge networks. We proceed to present and
discuss two empirical studies cases of clusters in developing economy
contexts guided by the above typology. The case studies are based on
the palm oil cluster in the municipality of Puerto Wilches in north east
Colombia and the mango cluster in the Piura area of Northern Peru.
These geographical clusters share a number of features, but also show
some important structural diﬀerences.
Table 1 provides details of some of the main characteristics of each.
Small and medium-sized (rather than micro) producers represent the
majority of growers in terms of numbers of producers and as a pro-
portion of total production in the cluster. Deﬁnitions of what is small,
medium and large are important. However, we draw on Fernandez-
stark et al. (2012) who view that size is a heterogeneous concept be-
cause beyond the physical size of land, producers have diﬀerent levels
of access to services and water. In our case we also distinguish produ-
cers through their reliance on larger producers for access to markets.
Both clusters are highly labour intensive with limited possibilities for
mechanisation but there is buoyant demand for these products in na-
tional (palm oil) and international (mango) markets. However the
clusters also resemble aspects of what Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer
(1999) have called survival clusters that suﬀer from poor entrepreneurial
competence and a dearth of management skills.
The palm oil cluster began production through the creation of a
palm oil reﬁnery ﬁrm in 1961, whilst export production for the mango
began in the 1990s with the establishment of key service organisations
and producer associations. As Table 1 shows, the mango producers have
two main associations, APEM and PROMANGO. The latter represents
the smaller producers with an average size of 51 ha. By contrast, in the
palm oil all but one of the producers has a smaller scale of production
with an average size of 9 ha.
The unit of analysis is the geographical cluster since physical
proximity plays an important role in knowledge networks. Two sets of
identical surveys were used, one for producers (17 in the palm oil, 26 in
the mango cluster), and one for service organisations (9 in the mango
cluster, 5 in the palm oil). Analysis of survey data was undertaken
through social network analysis (SNA) techniques that permit visuali-
zation and measurement of the structures of relationships and the
strategic of positioning of actors in these relationships. The survey data
was gathered in both clusters through identical face-to-face surveys.
The question asked to ﬁrms was: “from whom did your organisation (or
business) receive technical assistance for the introduction of new
practices and/or technologies and how important was this to your or-
ganisation”?4 Respondents were provided a list of organisations (pro-
ducers, services, universities, consultancies) and an open section to
name other organisations from whom assistance had been received and
to then identify and rank organisations from whom assistance was re-
ceived from 1 to 5 in ascending order of importance. From this in-
formation it was possible to produce a network map using open source
software, Pajek for social network analysis.
The subsequent analysis of network governance was investigated
through in-depth semi-structured interviews of actors in both clusters.
Qualitative data in the palm oil cluster involved two interviews with
small farmer representatives, two interviews with executives of large
palm oil companies, and shadowing of CENIPALMA R&D and ﬁeld staﬀ.
Group discussions also took place with high level oﬃcials of CENIPA-
LMA and FEDEPALMA (Colombian palm oil’s two linked re-
presentatives).
In the case of the mango cluster, twenty semi-structured interviews
took place with owners of small and medium-sized mango ﬁrms and
directors of the main intermediaries including APEM, PROMANGO, and
several government agencies with oﬃces located in Piura. The producer
Table 1
Mango Palm Oil
Size Omitting one large outlier producer, the average size of PROMANGO
producers is 51 ha and 124 for APEM members
Ranges from 7 to 26 ha with an average of 9 ha
Employees Just 5 out of 26 producers employs less than 10 people, although work is
seasonal
Mostly family. Some employees hired that live locally
Market 16 out of 26 producers sell product in international markets Oil palm bunches are sold in local market to processing mill. E1 is the only
processing mill represent in this sample
Certiﬁcation 18 producers are certiﬁcated by GlobalGap, 4 have Tesco TNC The most recognized certiﬁcation is given by the RSPO (Round on Sustainable
Palm Oil). Few oil palm growers certiﬁed
Other livelihood Some attempt to diversify to grape production Most small farmers combine a small amount (2 ha) of traditional products
(banana, plantain, cassava, and corn) with palm oil
4 This wording is similar to that used by Bell and Giuliani (2007) in her study of
knowledge networks in the wine industry.
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association congresses of APEM and PROMANGO were attended and
detailed notes made as observers.
7. Agri-food and social capital
Existing literature on social capital and small holder participation in
agri-food in developmental contexts, including Andean contexts sug-
gests that common practices and community action are driven by two
factors, access markets and addressing exclusion. The former camp in-
cludes the work of Hellin et al. (2009), Hartwich et al. (2008) and
Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson (2012) who all emphasize that
greater product diﬀerentiation and complexity of products as well as
high transaction costs to enter markets increases the likelihood of col-
lective participation and networks (and social learning) amongst small
holders. Other studies ﬁnd that even where the product has low
transaction costs, small producers can still gain advantages from col-
lective organisation in terms of for example bulk-buy and securing ac-
cess (Devaux et al., 2009; Hartwich et al., 2008; Kherallah et al., 2002;
Thorp et al., 2005).
A rather diﬀerent explanation for the existence of social capital is
presented in other studies where the focus is on the properties that bond
together communities facing asymmetries of knowledge from powerful
actors. Bernard and Spielman's (2009) work on poor farmers in Ethiopia
showed that low participation rates of the poorest farmers had little to
do with lack of material interests, but that they were often excluded
from decision making. This ﬁnding is in line with Thompson and
Scoones (1994) who argue that agribusiness involves encounters be-
tween organisations with varied interests, supported by diﬀerent re-
sources and relations of power. Therefore a critical reﬂection of farmer-
researcher-extensionist relations should be in terms of equity of re-
lationships and biases of actors.
The signiﬁcant feature of the above discussion is that quite con-
trasting narratives of social capital seem to co-exist. The literature tends
to favour one or other approach in its methodology although in practice
they inﬂuence one another, such as in the emergence of alternative
organic or fair trade value chains. The two cases discussed in this paper
represent undiﬀerentiated products at the point in which small pro-
ducers work with them. Capacity is important but occurs higher up the
value chain in preventative measures to reduce blights, certiﬁcation
and ensuring delivery of good quality produce.
The Colombian palm oil is dominated by three speciﬁc features. The
ﬁrst is the growing importance of small-scale producers as a proportion
of cultivated land in the industry.5 This has come about following a
government and United Nations sponsored programme of land dis-
tribution titled “Productive Alliances” to provide small-scale farmers
with alternatives to growing illicit drugs. Ten years ago large ﬁrms
purchased (from small holders) just 30% of the fruit for reﬁning, in
2010 this jumped to 70% (Cordoba, 2011), therefore their relationship
with small producers is critical for accessing regular supply.
Secondly, the sector experiences excess demand, ﬁrstly as a con-
sequence of the rise in domestic demand of palm oil for use as a bio-fuel
and secondly as consequence of the spread of the Pudricion del Cogollo
(PC), (translated but root disease) an airborne disease aﬀecting tropical
areas that has wiped out large numbers of palm trees. Large resources
have been devoted to prevention measures against the PC and its
treatment by CENIPALMA. Two prominent approaches include the re-
placement of the indigenous Colombia palm tree by the “African palm”,
a hybrid, that is hoped will be more resistant. The second approach
involves agricultural practices (maintenance of hydration infrastructure
and weed control) and plant disease treatment (combination of ferti-
lizer, pesticides and insecticides).
The third feature is the industry organisation in the rural areas.
Small farms tend to geographically cluster around large reﬁnery palm
oil plants in so-called UATTAS. The land surrounding the reﬁnery is
owned partly by the reﬁnery ﬁrm and partly by small producers called
“allies” who sell the basic produce to the larger reﬁnery. Physical
proximity between the producer of palm oil and reﬁnery ﬁrm is crucial
to maintain freshness. There are therefore two key organisations at the
centre of each cluster, a reﬁnery ﬁrm and in some cases a small pro-
ducer association.
Studies of palm oil in Colombia however also need to take into
account what can be quite contrasting local histories and patterns of
social capital can vary signiﬁcantly at regional and local level. In a
number of areas such as Cano Seco, Tamboral and Arenales in the south
west, and Bajo Ataro in the northwest of the country, so-called “new
entrepreneurs” took up palm oil production in the 1980s and 1990s in
zones aﬀected by the conﬂict with armed guerrilla forces. Lands were
“cleared” for palm oil production through the displacement of farmers
with the help of paramilitary forces (Vidal, 2011). In other regions,
including the central parts of Colombia, that is the focus of this study,
small holders have a longer history of involvement combining contract
farming, spot price sales and as agricultural labour. The take up of
national initiatives such as the Productive Alliances has been generally
well received, particularly since many farmers do not have access to
land and are therefore likely to be framed through opportunities for
productive activity.
The structure of the mango cluster in Piura resembles the palm oil in
terms of the numeric dominance of smaller and medium sized produ-
cers (see Table 1) and the production of a single agricultural com-
modity. Piura is one of the Peru’s country’s most important agricultural
regions. Post-war investments from the World Bank in water storage
and management helped overcome the challenges of an arid climate,
although export of mangos only began to increase signiﬁcantly in the
1990s when the ﬁrst hot water treatment plant was installed.
However, the end of the 1990s also witnessed an important conﬂict
between actors involved in agriculture and Canadian mining ﬁrms, such
as Manhattan Minerals of Canada in the Tambogrande region of Piura.
The mining project, as well as its requirement for signiﬁcant human re-
settlement posed large-scale appropriation of agricultural land, poten-
tial to pollute adjoining areas and displacement of farmers. The project,
eventually abandoned in 2003, prompted coordinated opposition from
parts of civil society including urban residents, market-oriented mod-
ernizing farmers and a rural peasantry (Bebbington, 2012). The ex-
perience and in particular the social mobilization behind it, cemented a
regional commitment to investment in agri-food as an activity that
would be likely to have more positive eﬀects for the local population.
This experience showed the ability to establish temporary local alli-
ances, although tensions between producers with access to export
markets and those without access appear again through the existence of
the two producer associations in the region, APEM and PROMANGO.
APEM represents organisations combining exporting and production
whilst PROMANGO, formed after a collapse of prices in 2002, re-
presents smaller-scale producers. Members of both associations make
up around 30% of growers and 60% of production and form the cen-
trepiece of the study. Other key organisations at local level include
SENASA, the phytosanitary government body and other service orga-
nisations play important roles. A key competence is reaching certiﬁ-
cation standards necessary for exports, combating fruit plagues such as
fruit ﬂy, incorporating a greater control and improvement in the detail
of production processes and technologies and establishing good net-
works with a range of buyers from diﬀerent export markets.
8. Analysis of network coherence
We begin the empirical analysis of network coherence that provides
information on the degree of connectedness of producers. Figs. 2 and 3
below provide an illustrative overview of the network of both clusters.
5 There are three classiﬁcations of farm size in the palm oil sector: large growers (more
than 500 ha), medium-sized grower (between 50 and 500 ha) and small sized growers
(less than 50 ha) (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013).
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Small producers are denoted with the preﬁx “agro” and all actors are
coloured diﬀerently according to the type of organisation and their
function in the clusters. If we include the organisations mentioned by
the interviewees as providers of knowledge (i.e. not all those inter-
viewed), the total number of mango cluster and the palm oil organi-
sations in each cluster number 75 and 37 respectively.
Figs. 2 and 3 shows the network maps of the mango and palm oil
clusters. The mango cluster appears as a highly-connected group of
producer ﬁrms at the core of which are a group of service providers.
The palm oil cluster illustrates a simpler hub-and-spoke structure with
small producers clustered around E1, a large local producer and
reﬁnery ﬁrm that is supplied palm oil by the surrounding small farmers
and CENIPALMA, the technology research arm of FEDEPALMA, the
national producer association. Although CENIPALMA formally re-
presents national palm oil producers, it is mainly inﬂuenced by the
larger organisations that provide most of its funding. Although both
networks appear highly centralized with limited connections between
organisations at the peripheries, the mango cluster has more producers
and services at the centre of the network.
Table 2 describes the organisations and actors in each cluster. It is
notable that although there are no large organisations in the mango
cluster, there is more heterogeneity of organisations reﬂected in higher
Fig. 2. Social Network Analysis Map of the Mango Cluster.
M. Ramirez et al. Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
7
numbers of intermediaries, government services and universities that
provide knowledge to the cluster.
We use K-core method that allows observation of the number of
links of all the vertices within the cluster and if any dense sub-networks
exist to analyse bonding. Table 3 below shows mean average k-core
values of 3.35 and 2 for the mango and palm oil cluster respectively
indicating signiﬁcantly higher levels of bonding in the mango cluster.
Moreover, the distribution in the mango cluster is skewed towards
higher values (64% of palm oil ﬁrms have just two links, 50% of mango
ﬁrms have four links) meaning that a signiﬁcant majority of small
farmers in the palm oil are reliant on just one or two channels of in-
formation. K-core also allows detection of dense sub-groups by re-
moving the lowest k-cores from the network until this breaks up into
dense components (de Nooy, 2011). With values of one omitted (i.e. we
just include values 2 to 5) Fig. 4 shows the palm oil network becomes
very sparse at K-core equal to ﬁve and is reduced to just two organi-
sations at K-core equal to ten. In other words very few actors have many
links. The mango network by contrast shows ﬁve organisations at K-
core equal to ten and three organisations at twenty. Although the palm
oil growers are therefore formally connected, the number of connec-
tions is very sparse and dependent on just two organisations with a high
number of links. By contrast within the mango cluster a number of
organisations have up to ten or higher links. We can conclude that
average bonding is signiﬁcantly higher in the mango cluster but also
that there are diﬀerent hubs within each cluster.
And yet, a more detailed analysis of bonding in the mango cluster
also reveals patterns of structural fragmentation hidden by average
values of connectedness. K-core analysis reveals that there is no direct
line of communication between APEM and PROMANGO the two most
prominent organisations. Moreover, very few small-scale producers
receive information from APEM and exporters from PROMANGO. Given
their central positions as representative associations this suggests
asymmetric information between the exporters association (APEM) and
small producers (PROMANGO).
In terms of bridging, we can refer to structural holes values that
measure non-redundant information ﬂows. Table 3 indicates high
Source: Calculated from author survey of mango producers 
 Source: Calculated from author survey of palm oil producers4
Fig. 3. Social Network Analysis map of the palm oil cluster. Source: Calculated from author survey of mango producers and author survey of palm oil producers.
[Note: Isolated actors such as “Sociedad de Comercio exterior”, “Fresh Peru”, “comprairer”, “img” and “pricewatch” were mentioned as organisations which are part
of the network but whose knowledge transfer was considered “unimportant” by the interviewees.]
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reliance in both clusters on a small number of organisations as conduits
of knowledge. However this measure doesn’t distinguish bridging from
inside and outside the cluster, knowledge from outside is likely to open
the cluster to new ideas. To do this we look at averages of indegree
centrality from outside the cluster. In table 3 we can see that this diﬀers
signiﬁcantly between the clusters, conﬁrming that in the palm oil there
is just one organisation that maintains signiﬁcant links outside the
cluster. The mango cluster by contrast shows more complexity in its
structure with a greater variety of organisations acting as bridgers that
include private producers and service providers. The data indicates that
the mango cluster is more open to diverse knowledge.
A revealing phenomenon appears if we compare indegree centrality
from outside the cluster with outdegree centrality, i.e. organisations
involved in bridging and bonding. Although we saw in the mango
cluster that a number of organisations are active in gaining knowledge
from outside the cluster, Fig. 5 shows that the privately owned orga-
nisations do not appear to be sharing this sharing knowledge, even with
their associations (for example agro 21). Only the state-run phytosa-
nitary body, and the producer associations are involved in collective
dissemination. Private ﬁrms in the mango cluster are more likely to
maintain knowledge in the private sphere. This contrasts with the palm
oil, where a single privately owned organisation reﬁnery E1, acts as
bridger and bonder, articulating the network of small producers (see
Fig. 5).
Summarising the results of network structure we ﬁnd that the in the
palm oil cluster there are few lead organisations and therefore bridging
values are lower. Low bonding reﬂects high reliance on a lead organi-
sation through a simple hub-and-spoke type network structure. The
mango cluster shows higher levels of bridging and bonding. The higher
numbers of intermediary organisations help increase bridging values
whilst some producers have broader links within the cluster. However
there is also a more complex network structure with a sub groups re-
presented by exporters and smaller producers. The establishment of
separate networks may reﬂect homophily, a concept developed to ex-
plain why actors with similar characteristics (for example geographical,
socio-economic, cultural) tend to stick together to form networks
(McPherson et al., 2001).
9. Case study interviews: bridging, bonding and governance
As expected, the analysis of network structure within our two case
studies established contrasting scenarios although governance in both
clusters is characterised by top-down centralisation of practices. As
discussed, the dominant narrative in the palm oil centres on containing
the devastation caused by the spread of the pudricion de cogollo (PC)
disease. Technicians based in the palm oil reﬁnery ﬁrms at the centre of
each cluster are responsible for diﬀusing know-how to surrounding
small-scale producers. Therefore practices emanate in a hierarchical
top-down fashion from established ﬁrms and attempts to reinterpret the
design of the scheme are not encouraged. Oﬃcials of CENIPALMA
further commented that convincing small farmers to undertake training
in recognising PC and to keep detailed records and take appropriate
measures is critical. Opportunities to access knowledge also depend on
the nature of the engagement and leadership provided by the organi-
sation at the centre of each cluster.
The interviews allowed us to diﬀerentiate two modes engagement
that could be described as paternal and reluctant modes of engagement.
Paternal engagement is represented by a dominant central organisation
– in this case a large reﬁnery ﬁrm – that steps in to assist small farmers
in the adoption of new techniques. However, in a neighbouring cluster
with very similar characteristics, the interviews suggested that the large
producer expends few eﬀorts to establish eﬀective channels of diﬀusion
and reﬁnery ﬁrms haven’t got the authority over small producers to
make them follow certain practices.
A CENIPALMA oﬃcial comments:
“There are some nucleos where the leading company is only really in-
terested in buying the fruit, it is not interested under which conditions this
is produced, but there are cases … where the whole sanitary scheme is
run by the anchor ﬁrm. So in some places it is working in others it hardly
exists”.
Relations between large and small producers appear to reﬂect the
ongoing pragmatism of small farmers in Colombia towards both sub-
sidies from the state and alliances with reﬁnery ﬁrms, particularly given
the limited ability of small farmers to inﬂuence practices.
Rather than dependence on one private producer, the mango clus-
ter’s network identiﬁed a number of organisations with diﬀerent gov-
ernance structures at the centre of the cluster, although two producer
associations wield signiﬁcant agency power on behalf of their members.
Network analysis also identiﬁed two sub-structures represented by
small-sized producers, with their representative association
Table 2
Source: Based on authors survey of palm oil and mango clusters.
Types of
Organisation
Palm oil Mango
Number of
actors by
organisation
Percentage Number of
actors by
organisation
Percentage
Large producers 3 8% 0 0
Small producers 15 41% 26 35%
Industry
intermediaries
3 8% 15 20%
State services 3 8% 8 11%
Overseas
organisation
0 0% 9 12%
Consultancy 3 8% 5 7%
University 4 11% 7 9%
Certiﬁcation ﬁrm
and other
services
4 11% 5 7%
Social organisation 2 5% 0 0%
Total 37 75
Table 3
Summary results of social network analysis.
Source: Calculated from author survey of palm oil and mango producers.
Palm Oil Mango
Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation Independient sample t-test (Sig. 2-tailed)
Cohesion Indegree from within cluster 2.06 0.827 3.85 2.073 0.000
K-Core 2 0.612 3.35 0.745 0.000
Brokering Structural holes (betweeness centrality) 0.39 0.21 0.66 0.12 0.000
Openness Indegree from outside cluster 0.88 1.9 2.85 2.014 0.025
Degree of sharing Outdegree centrality 1.86 5.81 2.94 4.46
Note: Mean values have been normalised to achieve normal distribution for t-test of signiﬁcant diﬀerence. It was not possible to calculate signiﬁcant diﬀerence for
“outdegree centrality” because too few organisations in the survey share knowledge.
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PROMANGO at the centre and larger exporters with APEM at the
centre.
Our interviews suggested that these sub-structures are underpinned
by fundamentally diﬀerent approaches to the adoption of technology.
The community of exporters around their association APEM is brought
together to maximize exports and insertion in markets. APEM plays a
strong brokering role by providing its members intelligence on prices in
international markets, bringing in external experts for export certiﬁ-
cations, opening up new export markets (currently in Asia) and estab-
lishing research partnerships with local universities. Implementation of
day-to-day practices is largely the responsibility of individual ﬁrms that
can hire agronomers to manage production.
The PROMANGO association by contrast is overwhelmingly focused
on the day-to-day practices of its members such has improving yields,
encouraging best practice in the use of fertilizer, treatment of trees,
storage and transporting. Its annual congresses resemble a community
of practice as producers gather to share experiences. Choices regarding
new technologies, such as the purchase of a hot-water treatment plant
(required for exports) and diversiﬁcation into grape and cacao pro-
duction are discussed thoroughly at the congresses and the technology
is shared by all members. The funds to buy capital and training are
raised jointly. Smaller producers therefore can inﬂuence practices and
technology through their independent representations.
PROMANGO oﬃcials recognized the need to transfer technologies
and other competences with APEM and exporter ﬁrms for certiﬁcation
and to agree prices and acknowledged the need to strengthen the value
chain. Nevertheless, as Figs. 3 and 4 showed, although some important
ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm collaborations exist, there are few direct lines of commu-
nication between the two associations. As a PROMANGO oﬃcial stated:
“From APEM we receive nothing in terms of technological knowledge, a
little bit of commercial information sometimes, such as databases of
exporters, I’d give then one on a scale of one to ﬁve”.
The sub-networks therefore reﬂect the direct access to export mar-
kets that members of APEM enjoy and PROMANGO don’t. This creates
asymmetry of power between small-scale producers and exporters in
the value-chain. Larger exporters are also often accused of delaying
payment to small producers and can charge high packing prices.
However, as indicated, there are also fundamentally diﬀerent norma-
tive values between these sub-networks groups which feeds into dif-
ferent ways of using technology. APEM emphasizes individual en-
trepreneurship and developing the Piura region as a marketing brand.
Source: Calculated from author survey of mango and 
                                   palm oil producers 
Fig. 4. K-core value.
Source: Calculated from author survey of mango and palm oil producers.
Source: Source: Calculated from author survey of palm oil producers 
Fig. 5. Outdegree centrality.
Source: Calculated from author survey of palm oil producers.
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These are critical in determining the costs required to gain entry into
export markets. As the APEM president noted:
“APEM is deﬁned by entrepreneurship, there are other institutions that
play a more social role, and can help the smallest producers, but our
members hardly intervene in this”.
PROMANGO by contrast prioritizes solidarity and collective actions,
where the needs of farmers and their families and communities guide
strategies and choices of technologies.
In summary, the mango cluster reﬂects important features of an
open and inclusive cluster. There are signiﬁcant relationships between
structure and governance. High levels of bridging are encouraged by
small producer collective action which creates a demand for services
that are diﬀerent to those of the large producers (for example tech-
nologies that can be used collectively). Despite few bilateral peer-to-
peer links between producers, higher levels of bonding is also explained
because of the diﬀerent intermediaries. Producers have access to more
service organisations and groups of producers have their own re-
presentative organisations.
Summarising, our two case studies appear in diﬀerent parts of our
typology. The palm oil cluster shows features of a fragmented cluster with
one or two organisations at centre with external links. Low levels of
bonding reﬂect absence of collective action and bilateral links by small
producers. Diﬀerent factors may explain this including geographical dis-
persion of producers and the absence of coordinating organisations such as
producer association or NGOs. Collective action may also be discouraged
by closing down opportunities for alternative practices.
10. Discussion and conclusions
Despite both clusters being dominated by highly centralized pro-
tocols for production, our approach allowed us to detect diﬀerent
narratives and practices of inclusion resulting from diﬀerences in net-
works and governance relationships. Two dominant patterns of inclu-
sion were initially identiﬁed with the help of our typology and case
studies. In the palm oil cluster a relatively fragmented cluster appears
with few bilateral links between small producers and high reliance on a
central actor, without whom the entire network would collapse. The
impact of such dominant organisations is uncertain. Large local orga-
nisations can shepherd a community towards positive collective out-
comes, for example by setting up experimental sites that can facilitate a
process of learning-by-watching (Rao and Ibáñez, 2005). These can lead
to highly rapid and eﬃcient diﬀusion of information. Nevertheless, in
highly dependent environments, dominant organisations may also
coerce small-scale producers into outcomes that are less favourable for
them. We also describe the mango cluster in Peru as “open and in-
clusive”, where top-down protocols for certiﬁcations and quality re-
quirements combine with a search for new knowledge based on norms
of participation that more closely respond to small producer needs such
as sharing technology. However knowledge asymmetries are evident
between larger and smaller producers.
We conclude with two linked points. We ﬁrstly revisit the point
made at the beginning of the paper concerning local (cluster) dynamics.
It is clear that social capital dynamics can strongly inﬂuence types and
forms of inclusion of small producers in agri-food clusters. Therefore,
whilst the introduction of agri-food value chains has detonated possi-
bilities (including local alliances) for the establishment of new networks
to penetrate markets, these are layered on to highly localised historical
and contextual factors that build in structural tensions and exclusion.
The paper therefore challenges some conceptions of technology diﬀu-
sion where formal adoption of agricultural technologies or crop man-
agement practices is synonymous with innovation opportunities and
beneﬁts for all actors (Roeling, 2007; Rogers, 2010).
Secondly, we address a perceived gap in work on spatial analysis of
inclusive innovation in agribusiness clusters identiﬁed by for example
Fafchamps (2006) and Bebbington et al. (2004) through the use of a
diagnostic of network structure. Network analysis can provide exact
measurable qualities that underlie the dynamic social processes of in-
terest to social capital as well as facilitating speciﬁcation and testing.
However, social networks does not always overlap with social capital
(Moody and Paxton, 2009). Thus the structural cleavage of the mango
network was a critical point, but could not be understood through small
world’s type approaches of Barabási (2003). Qualitative social capital
analysis was required to clearly express the close relation between so-
cial capital and social embeddedness i.e positive feeling about asso-
ciationalism or shared values (Moody and Paxton, 2009). By contrast,
in the palm oil cluster it was the hierarchical nature of the network and
how the agency of the reﬁnery ﬁrm was expressed that appeared critical
to technology diﬀusion for small producers. The implications of our
approach are double, information on structure provides important in-
sights into the properties of relations but ignoring the context of net-
works will provide only a partial picture. Therefore, as Moody and
Paxton (2009) point out, it is diﬃcult to divorce the structure of social
networks from social capital and we are better served by carefully
predicting the outcomes of each.
11. Policy implications
The analysis revealed that the dynamics of production and inclusion
diﬀered quite substantially and therefore require diﬀerent policy ap-
proaches. The mango case suggested a combined policy approach that
bridges the divide between exporters and non-exporters that will reduce
exclusions created by exclusive access to exporters. However, policy mea-
sures that support diﬀerent export models (large-scale commodity pro-
duction by APEM and smaller scale production based on organic and fair
trade) can increase cluster diversity and strengthen options for inclusion.
For the palm oil cluster the discussion of inclusion will be inﬂuenced by the
dominant role of the large reﬁnery organisations that also acts as buyer of
the produce of small scale farmers. Increasing the diversity of the cluster by
broadening the provision of services to small producers and lessening the
dependence on one central anchor organisation will reduce small producer
vulnerability and is likely to enrich provision of knowledge.
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